Security information management with frame-based attack presentation and first-order reasoning by Yan, Wei
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Digital Commons @ NJIT
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2005
Security information management with frame-
based attack presentation and first-order reasoning
Wei Yan
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Digital Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ NJIT. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@njit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yan, Wei, "Security information management with frame-based attack presentation and first-order reasoning" (2005). Dissertations.
716.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations/716
 
Copyright Warning & Restrictions 
 
 
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United 
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other 
reproductions of copyrighted material. 
 
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and 
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other 
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the 
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any 
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” 
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or 
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user 
may be liable for copyright infringement, 
 
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a 
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order 
would involve violation of copyright law. 
 
Please Note:  The author retains the copyright while the 
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to 
distribute this thesis or dissertation 
 
 
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select  
“Pages from: first page # to: last page #”  on the print dialog screen 
 
The Van Houten library has removed some of
the personal information and all signatures from
the approval page and biographical sketches of
theses and dissertations in order to protect the
identity of NJIT graduates and faculty.
ABSTRACT
SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT WITH FRAME-BASED
ATTACK REPRESENTATION AND FIRST-ORDER REASONING
by
Wei Van
Internet has grown by several orders of magnitude in recent years, and this growth has
escalated the importance of computer security. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is used to
protect computer networks. However, the overwhelming flow of log data generated by IDS
hamper security administrators from uncovering new insights and hidden attack scenarios.
Security Information Management (SHIM) is a new growing area of interest for intrusion
detection. The research work in this dissertation explores the semantics of attack behaviors
and designs Frame-based Attack Representation and First-order logic Automatic Reasoning
(FAR-FAR) using linguistics and First-order Logic (FOAL) based approaches. Techniques
based on linguistics can provide efficient solutions to acquire semantic information from
alert contexts, while FOAL can tackle a wide variety of problems in attack scenario reasoning
and querying. In FAR-FAR, the modified case grammar PCTCG is used to convert raw
alerts into frame-structured alert streams and the alert semantic network 2-AASN is used to
generate the attack scenarios, which can then inform the security administrator. Based on
the alert contexts and attack ontology, Space Vector Model (AVM) is applied to categorize
the intrusion stages. Furthermore, a robust Variant Packet Sending-interval Link Padding
algorithm (VPSLP) is proposed to prevent links between the IDS sensors and the FAR-FAR
agents from traffic analysis attacks. Recent measurements and studies demonstrated that real
network traffic exhibits statistical self-similarity over several time scales. The burst traffic
anomaly detection method, Multi-Time scaling Detection (LTD), is proposed to statistically
analyze network traffic's Histogram Feature Vector to detect traffic anomalies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The explosive proliferation of the Internet has extended communications to the entire world.
Moreover, the past few years have seen significant growth of cyber attacks on the Internet,
and network security has become a critical issue that cannot be neglected in the development
of computer networks. A significant increase in the spread of viruses, worms and Trojan
horses over the Internet has been observed. Acts of cyber crime such as Distributed Denial
of Service (DDS) attacks are one of the more serious problems which need to be tackled.
In practice, it is nearly impossible to prevent all network attack incidents. Detection of
network attacks then becomes an important reactive security function. Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) has become an important tool to secure networks by detecting, alerting and
responding to malicious activities. Intrusion [3] is defined as an attack in which a vulnerability
is exploited or a breach (resulting in a violation of the explicit or implicit security policy of
the system) is violated. Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to
malicious activities targeting at computing and network resources.
IDS can monitor and possibly defend against the attempts to intrude into or otherwise
compromise the network systems. An ideal IDS can detect all intrusions and report only real
intrusions (no false alarms). It can also provide instant overview of the type, location, and
severity of the attacks. Burrent IDS is far from ideal, as it incur high false alarm rate.
1.1 Background in Intrusion Detection System
IDS has recently gained considerable amount of interest in the computer security community.
IDS may be software-based or contains specialized hardware. The major objective is to
detect attack activities that may compromise system security. Figure 1.1 shows the IDS
infrastructure described in [?]. IDS inspects the contents of the network traffic to look for
possible attack signatures (patterns of malicious actions). For example, a SYN flood will be
noticed by an IDS when a particular host is sending SYN packets without ever attempting
to complete the connection. IDS can identify this and issue the corresponding alert to notify
1
2the security administrator. Afterwards, the defense response may be undertaken either by
the administrators or the IDS itself.
Figure 1.1 Intrusion detection system infrastructure [1] .
As shown in Figure 1.2, IDS is composed of the following core components: the sensor,
the attack knowledge database, and the attack response module. The sensor is an analysis
engine that contains the decision-masking mechanisms regarding intrusions. The detection
algorithm is implemented in the sensor, which uses a script to match the text string signatures
that are unique to the different intrusions. The signatures can be from a single event or a
sequence of events. Another method is to distinguish the normal and abnormal behaviors,
which can be done by statistical approaches. The IDS knowledge database includes the attack
signatures or normal behavior profiles, and necessary parameters. The attack response module
is responsible for managing the engine and presenting the attack reports.
Figure 1.2 Intrusion detection system components [1].
3IDS varies according to a number of criteria. IDS can be divided into Network-based
IDS (NIDS)[4, 5] and Host-based IDS (RIDS) [5] on the basis of the type of systems they
monitor. IDS that monitor the network for malicious traffic is called AIDS, whereas those
that monitor the activities on a single host are called RIDS. NIDES consists of several sensors
deployed throughout a network that report to a. central console. It can monitor the network
backbones and is effective at detecting outsiders attempting to penetrate the network defense.
RIDS operates on hosts and can monitor the operating and file systems for signs of intrusions.
Since RIDS has a limited view of only one host, it must be installed on every system being
monitored.
The techniques of intrusion detection can be divided into two main detection methods:
the misuse detection (such as Snort [6], Emerald [7]), and the anomaly detection (such as
NADIR [8] and AIDES [9]). A misuse detection system searches for a set of known attacks
that have been stored in a system database. The knowledge of the attacks is encoded
as a set of signatures, which are patterns produced by corresponding attacks. The main
disadvantage of misuse detection is that it can only detect the previously known intrusions,
and it cannot detect new attacks. Anomaly detection detects the intrusions as a pattern
recognition problem, rather than a signature matching problem. Anomaly detection builds
up a set of normal behavior profiles of network traffic or hosts. Anomaly detection IDS
constantly compares the newly generated profiles with the normal profiles. If it detects
what it considers to be a large deviation from normal behavior, it signals an alarm to the
system security administrator. With the anomaly detection, IDS can detect new attacks. The
amount of false positives, however, tends to be very high with this mechanism. Bontemporary
commercial IDS, such as ISIS RealSecure [5], Bisco Secure IDS [10], Semantic Manhunt [11],
Enterasys Dragon [4], use mostly the misuse detection methods with a model function of
anomaly detection components.
Alerts generated by an IDS consist of two states: positive (indicating an intrusion)
or false (not indicating an intrusion). Thus, alerts fall into four possible classifications: true
positive means IDS appropriately indicates an intrusion; true negative means IDS appropriately
does not indicate an intrusion; false positive means IDS inappropriately indicates an intrusion;
false negative means IDS does not inappropriately indicate an intrusion. IDS should maximize
4the true states, and at the same time minimize the false ones [12]. The most serious problems
of IDS is the high false alarm rate (the high number of false positives), because a large number
of false positives requires large amount of time to investigate.
1.2 Security Information Management
IDS generates a huge volume of alert events which are caused by elementary alerts and
false alarm alerts [13, 14]. It is very time consuming and resource intensive for the security
administrator to analyze this large of data and to review all the alerts, thereby hampering
the performance of attack detection. Furthermore, many enterprises simply cannot afford to
recruit security administrators merely for monitoring the alerts.
Cithin the past few years, a new security system, Security Information Management
(SIM), has emerged as a solution in solving the above mentioned problems. SHIM is defined as
a set of processes undertaken to ensure that IDS events are collected, analyzed, and responded
in the shortest period of time possible, thus ultimately reducing the administrator's reviewing
time [15]. Chy collect the alerts from distributed IDS sensors? With the detailed alerts stored
in the multiple sensors, valuable attack information can be easily lost. By centralizing this
information, events from distributed IDS sensors can be correlated and categorized.
SHIM should enable a security administrator to quickly and easily find the hidden attack
scenarios from the collected events, but this requires that the events from the various sources
are normalized. Cithout the alert normalization, the processing speed at which the events
can be analyzed is significantly decreased. Alert normalization requires a set of schema with
a fixed number of fields to standardize incoming data regardless of its source.
Figure 1.3 shows the architecture of IDS with SHIM. The logs from the fireballs,
servers, and network devices are collected by SHIM, where the security events are analyzed and
correlated. Attack scenarios are then generated and delivered to the security administrator.
SIΜ is composed of four parts: aggregation, normalization, correlation, and visualization.
Aggregation means the reduction of redundant data. In the normalization step, SIM collects
the event data from multiple IDS sensors across the network. Since the data from each
security device may not be in a common format, SHIM converts them into a common format.
During the correlation process, SIΜ measures the relationship of security events to determine
5the incident potential. The visualization model interface provides the capabilities of intrusion
reporting for quick responses.
Figure 1.3 Architecture of IDS system with SIM.
Various issues have to be considered when designing SHIM. First, heterogeneous IDS
sensors may be installed throughout the networks. Chen SHIM collects the event alerts from
these decentralized sensors, the major obstacle is the lack of a universal alert description
standard. Almost every IDS product has its own alert format, and these nonuniform alert
reporting formats make alerts correlation time-consuming and difficult. Intrusion Detection
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) was proposed to be a standard IDS alert format [16].
It includes object-oriented class and a list of attributes that can describe a specific alert. For
example, IDMEF includes analyzer, create time, node, user, process, and service attributes.
However, IDMEF limits the alert semantic representation and reasoning because it does not
provide the fields for intrusion behavior semantics, making automatic reasoning for intrusion
scenarios difficult to implement. In this dissertation, IDMEF is extended to include semantic
reasoning and query in capabilities.
Second, IDS can generate a large volume of alert streams, which may have a relatively
high chance of being false alarms. To overcome this problem, different correlation methods
[17, 18, 19, 20] were proposed to combine and analyze attack events from IDS. According
to [3], intrusion correlation refers to the combination and analysis of information from all
available sources about target system activities for the purposes of intrusion detection and
response. However, these syntactic approaches are vendor-specific, and the heterogeneous IDS
6sensors require the installations of multi-vendor correlation tools, resulting in costly network
management.
Third, generally there are two methods to analyze the events: real-time analysis and
off-line analysis. The goal of real-time event analysis aims to shorten the time of detecting
and responding to the intrusions, thus reducing the exposure time to any given threat. In
[21], the Exposure Time (ET) is equal to the Detection Time (DT) plus the Reaction Time
(AT). The smaller ET is, the smaller the risk.
Real-time analysis is the ideal way of protecting information assets. However, the
more complex the real-time event analysis is, the more difficult it is to keep up with all the
events being collected. Off-line analysis collects and analyzes data at longer time intervals,
and provides more detailed results than real-time analysis. Off-line analysis can present
charts and graphs to the administrators so it is easier to make the intrusion conditions more
understandable. Therefore, implementing SIM should keep a balance between the benefits of
real-time analysis versus the necessity for off-line analysis. In this dissertation, First-order
Reasoning (FOR) is used in real-time analysis to extract the attack scenarios, whereas attack
semantic query is used during the off-line analysis.
Fourth, inadequate attention has been paid to the SHIM attack knowledge query interface.
Α well-designed interface can facilitate attack monitoring by making specific queries for the
attack scenario knowledge. The traditional keyword search, such as Analysis Bonsole for
Intrusion Database [22], which asks the user to enter the keywords (e.g., IPA address or alert
message name, etc.) and then returns the alerts containing these items, is not suitable for the
intrusion search because the number of the keyword occurrences cannot tell how relevant the
search result is to the whole attack plan. For example, due to the existence of false alarms and
alerts triggered by the normal network activities, one occurrence of "buffer overflow" alert
may be more significant than tens of "Tenet" alerts. IDS should support attack semantic
query, such as queries like "by which means the attacker controls the host or subnet, and what
is the attack path from controlling the subnet to launching DDS attacks to the application
7server?" To implement such queries, the alerts' semantic information should be extracted
and the alerts need to be categorized into several intrusion stages.
In this dissertation, the semantics of network intrusion behaviors are exploited and
a security information management system, Frame-based Attack Representation and Firs-
Border logic Automatic Reasoning (FAR-FAR) is proposed to reason the attack scenarios and
categorize the alerts into different intrusion stages based on Aatural Language Processing
(ALP) and FOR. The Principal-subordinate Bonsequence Tagging Base Grammar (PBTBG)
is used to formalize IDS alerts into frame-structured streams. The FOR tree is then used
to extract the attack scenarios. Afterwards, mutual information is applied to determine the
alert context range. Based on the alert contexts, the alerts are represented as the semantic
space vectors. Finally, Vector Space Model (ISM) is used to categorize these vectors into
different intrusion stages.
1.3 Approach Taken in This Dissertation
This dissertation describes the studies on
• exploiting ALP and FOR techniques on FAR-FAR to implement attack knowledge
extraction semantic scheme;
• proposing an IDS semantic event analysis model formalized by Description Logics, which
allows inferring the attack scenarios and enabling the attack knowledge semantic queries;
• using text mining techniques and vector space model to categorize the alerts into
different intrusion stages;
• proposing Multi-Time scaling Detection (LTD) based on Histogram Feature Vector
(HIV) to detect the burst traffic anomalies;
• proposing Variant Packet Sending-interval Link Padding Method (VPSLP) to defend
against the traffic analysis attacks based on heavy-tail distribution.
More specifically, the work in this dissertation differs from other research work in the following
aspects:
• By converting the attack facts and alert streams into Bonjunctive Aormal Form clauses,
FAR-FAR can implement both the alert correlation methods and the high-level reasoning.
• The research work in this dissertation applies the ALPO method to extract the semantic
concept structures from the semi-structured log alerts and represent them in a uniform
way.
8• The FAR-FAR semantic scheme converts alerts from "raw syntax" to "well semantics"
by Description Logics
• Cith the attack ontology, FAR-FAR generates the semantic space vectors based on
which the space vector model is applied to categorize the intrusion stages.
1.4 Basic Concepts
In this section, the terminologies used throughout this dissertation are introduced, and the
definitions of the attack ontology concepts are adopted from [23, 24].
Access - establish logical or physical communication or contact.
Account - a domain of user access on a computer or network which is controlled according
to a record of information which contains the user.
Action - a step taken by a user or process in order to achieve a result.
Attack - an attempt to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability of (the use of)
information residing on a computer.
Attacker - an individual who attempts one or more attacks in order to achieve an objective.
Attack class missing focus alert number - the number of focus alerts that the attack
scenario class does not include.
Attack class false focus alert number - the number of focus alerts that exist in the
attack scenario class, that are not actual focus alerts.
Attack class node instance rate - the percentage of attack instance nodes in an attack
scenario class.
Attack class instance rate - the percentage of attack instance links in an attack scenario
class.
Attack class missing attack link number - the number of focus links the attack scenario
class does not include.
Attack class false attack link number - the number of focus links that exist in the attack
scenario class, but are not focus links.
Attack scenario - S = {(€ j , a l ), (€2 , a2 ), • • • (An , αυ ) } is an attack sequence of events and
actions, where 2-tuple (Ai , at ), 1 < i < n, which implies that attack action ai is the
primary action performed in the attack event A i , and the effect of the event is caused
by Ai  .
9Attack scenario class - given a sequence of the attack actions the attack scenario class
is defined as all possible combinations of correlated actions with the relation weights
above the semantic weight threshold. The attack scenario class includes all possible
attack strategies the attacker may take.
Attack scenario instance - the subset of the attack scenario classes, generated based on
the alert context.
Attack scenario missing attack links Attack scenario missing attack links means the
number of focus links the attack scenario scenario does not include.
Boundary condition - a process attempts to read or write beyond a valid address boundary
or a system resource is exhausted.
Buffer overflow - the classic buffer overflow results from an overflow of a static data structure.
Command - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands to a process
through direct user input at the process interface.
Configuration vulnerability a vulnerability resulting from an error in the configuration
of a system.
Data - facts, concepts, or instructions in a manner suitable for communication, interpretation,
or processing by humans or by automatic means.
Delete - remove a target, or render it irretrievable.
Denial of Service - intentional degradation or blocking of computer or network resources.
Design vulnerability - a vulnerability inherent in the design or specification of hardware
or software whereby even a perfect implementation will result in a vulnerability.
Exploits - vulnerabilities such as race conditions or undefined states in a hardware or
software component that lead to performance degradation and/or system compromise.
False negative alarm - occurs when there is an attack and IDS does not raise an alarm.
False positive alarm - occurs when there is no attack and IDS raises an alarm. This
case can be problematic because administrators, facing a false positive, might take
unnecessary actions.
Frame - a labeled, typically with the name of the object it represents, and is made up of a
series of slots. Each slot cab contains a variable number of entities.
Histogram Feature Vector - given a trace including some bins, a Histogram Feature
Vector is a vector composed of the histogram frequency of every bin.
Horn clause - a statement containing at most one negative literal.
Increased access - an unauthorized increase in the domain of access on a computer or
network.
Input validation - an input validation vulnerability exists if some malformed input is
received by a hardware or software component and is not properly bounded or checked.
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Kernel space - a process executing as part of the operating system, either compiled into
the kernel or a module that is loaded into and executed by the kernel.
Local - the attacker needs to be "virtually" present at the target.
Malformed input - a process accepts syntactically incorrect input, extraneous input fields,
or the process lacks the ability to handle field-value correlation errors.
Noun sequences - the noun compound or complex nominal.
Probe - access a target in order to determine its characteristics.
Process - a program in execution, consisting of the executable program, the programs
data and stack, its program counter, stack pointer and other registers, and all other
information needed to execute the program.
Race Condition - an error occurring during a timing window between two operations.
Remote - the attacker does not need to be "virtually" present at the target.
Root access - the attack results in the attacker having complete control of the system.
Scan - access a set of targets sequentially in order to identify which targets have a specific
characteristic.
Script or program - a means of exploiting a vulnerability by entering commands to a
process through the execution of a file of commands or a program at the process
interface.
Spoof - masquerade by assuming the appearance of a different entity in network communications.
Toolkit - a software package which contains scripts, programs, or autonomous agents that
exploit vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability - a weakness in a system allowing unauthorized action.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
The rest of the this dissertation is organized as follows:
Bhapter 2 describes the related works in NNLP, Semantic Ceb, and First-order Logics.
The semantic scheme of FAR-FAR is also presented.
Bhapter 3 introduces the basics of DL, presents Principal-subordinate Bonsequence
Tagging Base Grammar, and proposes the VPSLP scheme to defend traffic analysis attacks
on anonymous links between IDS sensors and agents.
Bhapter 4 describes the 2-Atom Alert Semantic Aetwork, resolution tree, alert window
size and attack scenarios. It also expounds how to generate the feature vectors from alerts,
and apply the vector space model to categorize the intrusion stages.
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Bhapter 5 describes the attack scenarios semantic query model and simulation results.
Bhapter 6 statistically present the analysis of histograms of ordinary-behaving bursty
traffic traces, and apply LTD to detect bursty traffic anomalies.
Bhapter 7 describes the conclusions and future work.
CHAPTER 2
SEMANTICS INSPIRED SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM: FAR-FAR
2.1 Related Work
2.1.1 Alert Correlation
The overwhelming flow of alerts generated by IDS make it difficult for the security administrator
to uncover the hidden attack scenarios. Some research studies [17, 18, 19, 20, 25] have
shown that the alert correlation is an efficient solution. In [3], alert correlation is defined
as the interpretation, combination, and analysis of information from all available sources
about target system activities for the purposes of intrusion detection and response. The
alert correlation methods can efficiently relieve the burden on the security administrator in
reviewing the large number of alerts.
In [17], the aggregation and correlation component (ABB) was introduced and its
purpose is to group the alerts into the duplication relationship and consequence relationship.
Duplicate relationship is defined in the duplicate definition file. For example, to be considered
a duplicate, the new alert's attributes must be equal to the previous alerts. The consequence
relationships are defined in the consequence definition file according to the causal relations.
M2D2 [25] includes four information types in the alert correlation process: the monitored
system, the known vulnerabilities, the security tools, and the alerts. A mapping function
is used to convert the non-formal vulnerability names into the formal ones. Furthermore,
the prerequisites are modeled as remote, remote user, and local. The consequences of the
vulnerability are grouped as BodeExec, DES, and Info. This kind of classification can be
viewed as a preliminary attack ontology. As a result, M2D2 aggregates alerts as "caused by
the same event" and "referring to the same vulnerability". SRI [19] introduced a probabilistic
approach that can handle the heterogeneous alerts based on an alert template (not IDMEF).
The correlation approach considers the alert feature similarity. In [18], a new incoming
alert is compared to the latest alerts in all existing scenarios, and then joins the scenario
with the highest probability score. However, this method requires the attack scenarios to
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be generated in advance manually and that may not be adapted to the diverse attacks and
attack strategies. In [20], the correlation system uses the hyper alert that includes facts,
prerequisites, and consequences of the intrusion. The hyper alerts can be correlated if the
consequence of a hyper alert fulfills the prerequisites of the second hyper alert. This alert
correlation method is largely based on the causal relation. However, sometimes launching
certain attacks requires several steps which cannot be correlated with the causal relation.
2.1.2 Natural Language Processing and Semantic Web
There are immediate needs for improvement in information security technology that can
protect networks against attacks while eliminating the needs of constant human intervention.
This leads us to explore various automation techniques that can lessen the human workload.
The use of state-of-the-art ALP techniques in information security has been addressed in
several other researches. In [26], Raskin introduced ways in which methods and resources of
ALP can be fruitfully employed in the domain of information assurance and security (lAS).
He expounded that there was more incentive to apply NNLP in contemporary IAS applications,
such as the intelligent searching or the attack query answering. Ontological semantics [27] are
employed to standardize terminology in the domain of lAS by translating non-standard terms
in the texts into standard equivalents. Both the approaches and the ontology are borrowed
from the field of NNLP and adjusted to the needs of the security domain. Aatural language
information security also involves the use of ALP for intrusion prevention and detection. For
example, LAMBDA [28], an attack description language is defined in a syntactic framework.
The CERIAS group [29] developed some lAS applications using NNLP. Furthermore, they also
recommended the inclusion of ALP in IDS for more effective use of correlation engines. With
the ALP model, IDS sensors can transform the input alerts into a well-defined format which
can thereby be categorized.
On the other hand, Internet is primarily composed of information designed only for
human to understand, but not for machine interpretation. For example, Extensible Markup
Language (XML) standards provide a syntactic structure for describing data. Unfortunately,
many different ways can be used to describe the same data by XML, and machines cannot
unambiguously determine the correct meaning of the XML documents. In [30], Berners-Lee
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described his vision of the Semantic Ceb, the aim of which is to add the markups to the web
information and allow them readable by machines. Some previous works on semantic web
have been imported in the area of semantic query. In [31], an approach for information
retrieval over the Semantic Ceb is presented and used as the knowledge representation
language. Passenger Identification, Screening, and Threat Analysis application (PASTA)
[32] is developed to discover the threats for aviation safety. In [33], the authors proposed
a framework for intrusion detection that is based on runtime monitoring of temporal logic
specifications. The intrusion patterns are specified as formulas in First-order Logics (FOAL).
In this section, the attention is focused on how to combine the ideas mentioned
above. Fig 2.1 represents the layered attack knowledge representation formalism, whose
aim is to formalize the raw alerts into the machine-understandable, computable and finally
implementable formalism. In the alert understandable layer, the syntactic-format alerts are
converted into machine-understandable semantic alert streams by PCTCG and the ontology
defined in the intrusion security domain. Every entity in the ontology has a corresponding
element in the Description Logics (DL) formalism. Afterwards, 2-Atom Alert Semantic
Aetwork (2-ΑΑSΝ) was generated from PCTCC streams, and semantic operations are used
over 2-ΑΑSΝ to generate the hidden attack scenarios. In the attack scenarios, entities and
relations referenced in the ontology are translated into individuals within the DL system.
Then, the spreading activation technique is used to implement the semantic attack knowledge
search. Specifically, the conjunctive query is translated into a sequence of query terms using
DL, and the answer to the conjunctive attack knowledge query is constituted by the set of
instances of each query term.
Figure 2.2 Attack knowledge extraction semantic scheme.
Figure 2.2 shows the functional architecture of the semantic scheme. It includes four
layers: the syntax layer, the semantic layer, the ontology layer, and the pragmatic layer.
In the syntax layer, the raw data in the form of alert log files forms the basis. Ce can
also extend the data model to support other types of logs to make the syntax layer more
compatible. IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) was proposed to be a
standard alert format in the intrusion detection systems [16]. However, one principle problem
of IDMEF is its use of XML (syntax structure), which limits the semantic representation.
Therefore, a uniform semantic representation for the raw alerts has to be defined. The
semantic layer, the ontology layer, and the semantic application layer are above the syntax
layer, enabling the alerts to be understandable by the machines. In the semantic layer, there
exist several semantic knowledge databases and each type of sensors has its own semantic
knowledge database, where the semantic information of all the alert messages of the sensor
is stored. The semantic knowledge databases are built up and maintained by the semantic
extractor, which extract the semantic information from various types of raw data and stored
them in the databases. The alert file and the sensor type are the inputs to the PCTCG
converter. Using the semantic information in the corresponding semantic knowledge database,
the PCTCG converter transfers the raw alerts into uniform PCTCG streams. Note that not all
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the incoming alerts but rather the different alerts in the alert log are converted into PCTCC
streams, resulting in less computation. In the ontology layer, the action-based semantic
ontology is applied to the PCTCC streams to generate 2-ΑΑSA semantic networks. In the
pragmatic layer (pragmatic means how semantics is used in network security monitoring),
the correlation rules were applied to 2-ΑΑSA to derive the attack scenario classes for further
modifications by the security administrator. In addition, the feature index table is also built
up from the frame streams, that records the feature frequencies in the segmented time slots.
Based on the alert contexts, the alerts are transformed into the attack space vectors and
the vectors of the intrusion stages are compared to determine which intrusion the alerts
belong to. Finally, the highly interpretable reasoning results can be forwarded to the security
administrator.
CHAPTER 3
DESCRIPTION LOGICS, PRINCIPLE-SUBORDINATE CONSEQUENCE
TAGGING CASE GRAMMAR, AND LINK PADDING
As mentioned in Chapter 2, FAR-FAR should collect the raw alerts from IDS sensors and
convert the alert contents into formal representations. In FAR-FAR, the alerts are converted
into semantic frame slots by PCTCC first and then the slots are represented with a formal
description. In this dissertation, DL is used as the formalism for representing attack knowledge.
DL is a formal logic language for representing knowledge and is the core of the knowledge
representation system. Furthermore, to defend against the traffic analysis attacks on the links
between the IDS sensors and SIM, the link padding approach based on heavy-tail distribution
is introduced. After the link padding, the first-order statistical features of the traffic of the
links are similar.
3.1 Description Logics
A knowledge representation is a fragmentary theory of intelligent reasoning. To support
reasoning about the intrusion attack, a knowledge representation must describe their behavior
and interactions. DL [34] is a formal language for representing knowledge and is the core of
the knowledge representation system. DL systems provide their users with various inference
capabilities that allow them to deduce implicit knowledge from the explicitly represented
knowledge. In this section, some basic definitions of DL are introduced and the attack
ontology is based on DL.
Definition 3.1.1 (Knowledge Base) A KnowlAdge Base KB based on DL includAs a TBox
T and an ABox A, and is denoted as KB =< T, A>. T contains intAnsional knowledge
in the form of a terminology while A contains assertional knowlAdge that is spAcific to the
individuals of thA domain.
Definition 3.1.2 (DL Interpretation) A DL interprAtation Ι is a pair Δ 1 and ., where
thA Δ1 is a non-Ampty sAt callAd thA domain of the interpretation, and - Σ is an interpretation
function. Interpretation function Δ1 maps
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Definition 3.1.3 (Box terminological axioms) The terminological axioms in Τ make
statemAnts about how concApts or roles arA rAlated to each othAr, and describe thA structurA
of a domain. The terminological axioms have the form: A = Β, A C B, and A (l Β - 0,
wherA the axiom of the first kind is called equation, while the axiom of the second kind is
called inclusion, and thA axiom of the third kind is called disjointness. If the interprAtation Ι
satisfiAs an axiom α, let denote this as Ι = α.
Definition 3.1.5 (DL syntax and semantic) Let A and B bA concepts and R be a role.
The following DL constructors build complex concApts and roles from simplAr ones. The
interpretation Ι can be extAndAd to concApt dAscriptions by the following inductive definitions.
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In order to extract the semantic information from raw alerts, the system's flaws and how
the attacker breaches the network need to be known. For example, the "buffer overflow"
flow can result in the attacker being able to run any arbitrary program and gain the root
or administrator privileges. Attempts have been made to categorize and classify those
computer attacks. The taxonomy should be specific and comply with the established security
terminology. In [35], a summary of the computer misuse techniques was outlined as nine
categories. The work in [36] develops a taxonomy of security threats: from the system to the
program running on the system, then to the result of the breaches.
In Figure 3.1, John Howard [37] categorized the BERT incidents on the Internet and
created an attack taxonomy with types of attackers, tools used, access information (such as
why it was broken and what was used in the access), results of the break-in, and the objectives
of the attack. The taxonomy of computer and network attacks developed for this research
is used to present a summary of the relative frequency of various methods of operation and
corrective actions. This taxonomy was taken and later expanded in the Sandia Laboratory
[24] .
The knowledge base refers to the representation of the relevant knowledge about the
application domain. It contains the concepts, the instances, and the relations. In this section,
KB is extended to the Attack Knowledge Base (.1C13) in the domain of intrusion security,
which is an expressive modeling approach to implement SIM. Τ and Α of Α1C13, as well as
the Attack Interpretation Al, are defined so that Al ΑΚΒ =< Τ, A >. In T , semantic
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intrusion attack ontology CST is defined based on attack behavior semantics. In UT , the
semantic roles chosen should reflect the semantic logic of attack actions. In this dissertation,
CST's classes are defined according to the interpretation of the noun sequences in the linguistic
literature, and build up the sub-taxonomy for every class based on the CERT taxonomy.
3.2.1 Classification of Noun Sequences
Table 3.1 Jespersen's Classification Schema
In ALP, theoretical linguistics has studied the classification of noun sequences (also
known as noun compounds or complex nominals) from various perspectives. Most of these
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Table 3.2 Lees' Classification Schema
studies have focused on the semantic aspect, discovering which are the functional relations
implicit between the nouns in a noun sequence. The discussions in Jespersen [38] and Lees
[30] focused on providing a classification which is sufficient for the description of the noun
sequences. The classifications in [38] are shown in Table 3.1, whereas Lees [39] mentioned
several other categories shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.3 Downing's Classification Schema
The description in Downing [40] focused on the functional roles of a noun sequence.
This attack taxonomy was similar to Jespersen's because those classes were both descriptive in
nature. Zachman's framework for information system architecture (ISA) [41] is widely used for
developing an enterprise information systems architecture. The purpose of ISA is to provide
a basic structure supporting the organization, integration, interpretation, development, and
changing of a set of architectural representations of the organizations information systems.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below represent the ISA's framework. The rows in Table 3.5 describe the
views of the ISA participants, and the columns depict a different focus. (As Zachman put
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it: "The same product can be described, for different purposes, in different ways, resulting
in different types of descriptions") Together, these six interacting focuses describe the entire
ISA architecture.
Table 3.4 Dimensions Summary
Table 3.5 Questions Summary
3.2.2 Attack Taxonomy in FAR-FAR
In this dissertation, the semantic roles are constrained based on the following questions that
security administrators would naturally ask: WhAn did the actions happAn? Where did thA
actions happen? By which means did the actions happen? What results did the actions cause?
etc.,
Figure 3.2 presents the three-layer 0T hierarchy of the concepts and relations. Each
concept in the ontology is described by a set of attributes. Object role means the receiving
end of the action, and it has has object and be object of attributes. The meronymy (has an
object) and holonymy (is a part of) attributes from part-whole role describe the situations that
one entity contains other entity. Consequence tagging role explains at which stage the attack
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may locate: gather information, making enable or launching attacks. In ,A, the instances
about the concepts and semantic relations in 0T are stored in the intrusion attack instance
base. The Attack Interpretation Al = (ΑΙ, . ) represents the mapping form the behavior
action space to attack scenario space. Every semantic role defined in 0T describes a semantic
aspect of a certain action. Based on Ντ , ΑΙ maps these loose and uncorrected individual
actions into coherent attack plan by the semantic expressive description.
C 7-= {
semantic roles C `d Location.Wherefl VMethod.What with VObject.Who/What
Π V(Possible)Cause.What it causesVConsequence tagging,
Where C V Include.Has location Vlnclude.Be location of,
What with C V Include.Has instrument location dlnclude.By means of,
Who/What C V Include.Has object Vlnclude.Be object of,
What is part of C `d Include.MeronymyΠ Vlnclude.Holonymy,
What it cause C V Include.(Possible) Causal dlnclude.Be (Possible) caused  by,
Consequence tagging C V Include.Gather Info Vlnclude.Make enable dlndude.Launch attack,
Has location C V Has attributes.state=active Π Has attributes.weight=4,
Be location of C V Has attributes.state=passiue Π Has attributes.weight=2,
Has instrument C V Has attributes.state=active Π Has attributes.weight=4,
By means of C V Has attributes.state=passive Π Has attributes.weight=4,
Has object C V Has attributes.state=actiue Π Has attributes.weight=4,
Be object of C V Has attributes.state=passive Π Has attributes.weight=2,
Has location C V Metonymy attributes.state=active Π Has attributes.weight=4,
Homonymy C V Has attributesstate=passive Π Has attributes.weight=3,
(Possiblecause C V Has attributes.state=active Π Has attributes.weight=4,
Be (Possiblecause by C V Has attributes.state=passiue Π Has attributes.weight=4.
Figure 3.2 Ontology of semantic roles and attributes.
Definition 3.2.6 (4KB Abox T) The T in ΟτΡ is a 3-tuple T =< C, R, A>, where C is
a set of classes, which denotA a set of the concepts, R is a set of the relations, which denote
the binary relationships between the concepts, and A is a set of the concepts' attributes.
Definition 3.2.7 (AKB Abox A) 4 contains the instances of C and R defined in C7-, and
is 3-tuple consisting of concepts, rAlations, and instances, 4 =< C, R, I >, where I is set of
class attributes.
Figure 3.3 Example of attack taxonomy classes.
In FAR-FAR, the ontology is generated by protege [42], which can use a reasoner to
check the consistency of the statements and definitions. FAR-FAR defines the classes and
the properties. The class represents the object in the interested domain. For example, the
empty ontology contains one class called owl : Thing, which is the class that represents the
set containing all individuals. The properties are the binary relations on the classes. The
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Figure 3.4 Example of attack taxonomy properties.
properties can have inverses. If some property links individual a to individual b then its inverse
property will link b to a. For example, the inverse of has objAct is bA objAct of. Figures 3.3 and
3.4 show the fragment of the classes and relations of the security taxonomy. Ontologists are
also used in order to provide more precise semantics of the relationships between the terms
and thus more precision may be applied when performing query expansion. Ontological
information may also be used to help in query reformulation. If a query input does not have
an answer, the query may be overly specific. Superclass may be used in order to make a
query more general in an attempt to find answers.
3.3 PCACG
Based on the definition of attack scenario in Section 1.3, the attack actions in the attack
scenario can be converted into the semantic role structures which are independent of the
specific attack events. As a matter of fact. : linguistic methods are mature enough to acquire
word semantics from the contexts. The formalism for actions used in most Natural language
understanding systems is based on case grammar. Each action is represented by a set of
assertions about the semantic roles the noun phrases play with respect to the verb. Since
every attack action can be regarded to be associated with a certain verb in linguistics, the
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semantic information is extracted from heterogeneous alerts by the modified Case Crammar
theory, PCTCG [43] .
The reasons for using Case Crammar are three folds: First, Case Crammar structure
specifies the semantic relations (slots) between a verb and other entities [44]. Frame is useful in
representing descriptive or stereotypical conceptualization of events. Second, Case Crammar
is easily represented by a semantic network, which includes abundant semantic relations that
can express the alerts' associations. Third, unlike the syntactic level, Case Crammar theory
is deep semantic [45], which means it does not change under grammatical transformations. As
shown in Table 3.6, Subject role and Object role change in syntactic level when the sentence
switches from active to passive form. However, the AgAnt (AgAnt is what causes the action of
the verb) and Theme (Theme is the object in motion or being located) roles in the semantic
level remains the same.
The aim of PCTCC is to normalize the aggregated intrusion alerts into uniform
semantic representation of attack behavioral actions. An attack scenario can be regarded as
a sequence of attack events, in which each includes a certain attack action. When considering
two alerts (two actions), the semantic roles need to be used to correlate them, and the
Principal-subordinate relation is applied on the two alerts. When one alert is in the principal
phase, it is treated as a verb and replace the other alert with its subordinate keywords (noun
phrases). If the subordinate keywords rein a specific case relationship with the verb, then
these two alerts are correlated.
PCTCC is formally defined as G = {Μ , C , F, S}, where Μ,,, is the alert messages
set of the IDS sensor with sensor name n, C specifies the set of possible semantic roles
(slots) between alerts, F is the set of case fillers (legal value for each slot), and S is the set
of subordinate keywords. Traditional case grammar includes a selection restriction, which
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specifies accepting or rejecting case fillers between the main verb and the noun phrases [45]
(for example, the object of the verb drinking must be a liquid substance).
In PCTCG, since the selection restriction of case grammar has been shifted to the
semantic knowledge databases, the set of selection restrictions will not be included. For every
alert, there are several subordinate keywords which can describe the alert background well.
For example, consider two Snort alerts: FINGER 0 quAry and FINGER rAdirAction attempt.
Their semantic attributes and case fillers are shown in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 Semantic Attributes and Case Fillers
In this dissertation, FOAL [46] is used as the alert representing and reasoning language.
In FOAL, there are three types of logic symbols:
• predicate: predicates denote the semantic roles defined in 0T.
Based on the alert semantic information, their PCTCG streams are represented by
predicate logic format:
Ε[Μ„:(FINGER 0 query)?rj
e. [υ{cοmmαnd( C::has object (FINGER daemon), third pariy,v)J Λ C: possible cause
(User account, passwοrd)ΛC::cause (FINGER command with username '0')
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Figure 3.5 PCTCG diagram.
Λ C:: consequence tagging( launching attackers: (Finger query, third party)].
E[Mn :(FINGER redirection attempt)snort]=
λe.[3υ[forward(C::has object(FINGER query),third party)]  Λ C: possible cause (gain info)
ΛC::cause (Dos, indirect connectioners:(Finger query, third party)].
where E is an entity described as "the event in which the Finger daemon forward the
query to the third party" . 3A means "there exists an event..." , 3ν means "there exists a kind
of attack action...", "A"  is logical conjunction, and :: means "include". Here, has objAct,
possiblA cause, cause, consequAnce tagging are the semantic roles, fingAr request, +info, DDS,
indirect connection, launching attack fill the slots of the above roles respectively, and FINGER
bequest and thirty party are the subordinate keywords. Predict logic describe the conjunction
of the action predicate with other predicates described in the event. Based on [34], the
following formulas are defined to translate the predict logic into DL.
Definition 3.3.8 (Predict logic transform axioms) ThA following axioms arA defined to
translate thA predict logic to DL:
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In Figure 3.5, the Entity-Relationship (EAR) diagram is used to represent the PCTCG
format. The EAR scheme can be translated into DL description. Each entity in the EAR
diagram can be translated into a concept in DL, while each EARL role is translated into a DL
role. The DL statement of EAR can be expressed as follows:
Bib is true for i = 1, • , n, then Α is true. A statement is called a Horn clause if it contains
only at most one negative literal [46]. For example, a positive Horn clause [x1 , x2 , -Cy] can be
thought as x 1 Λ x2 y or "if both x 1 and x2 happen, then y must happen".
Backward or forward chaining are two primary methods for knowledge reasoning.
Backward chaining starts with the hypothesis, and it works backward from the hypothesis
to the facts which support the hypothesis. Forward chaining travels from the facts to the
conclusions. To determine whether backward or forward chaining should be used depends
on the specific problems. If the given attack facts can reach a large number of resolutions,
and few of which you are interested, then backward chaining should be adopted. Otherwise,
forward chaining should be used. To determine which method is better in reasoning the
attack scenarios, consider the following situation. For the security administrator, what are
known to him/her are the vulnerabilities of the networks and hosts, the malicious attacks
being happened, and the generated alerts; he/she also wants to know if some specific attack
attempts happened. Equivalently, in the view of SHIM, FAR-FAR stores the vulnerabilities
of the networks and hosts into the AKA in advance, and converts the generated alerts into
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frameAbased streams, and then into Horn clause facts. To extract the attack scenarios, FAR-
FAR needs to check whether or not the AKA together with the production rules can satisfy
questions related attack attempts: when, where, by which means,what resulted from the
attack? Cith the semantic roles defined in Ο - , the reasoning goals can be predefined.
Furthermore, to guarantee real-time efficiency, reasoning should be done without unrelated
conclusions. Therefore, backward chaining is chosen; that is, given some production rules and
a AKA containing a set of FOAL Horn clauses, whether or not the interested attack attempts
can be derived needs to be known.
In the simulations, Prolog is used as the backward chaining language. Ay backtracking,
the inference engine provides Prolog with powerful reasoning capabilities [47] . A Prolog
program consists of a sequence of goals G, which are either atomic goals or negations of
atomic goals, the production rules R, and a set of predicate definitions P, which are either
alert's frame structures or the ontology attack facts. The production rules are expressed as
conditional sentences in the form:
IF semantic roles match THEN semantic correlation.
For example, the attack facts and objAct correlation rule of alert FINGER request can be
represented in Prolog as clauses:
3.5 First-order Logic Reasoning for Alert Correlation
In this section, FAR-FAR's automatic alert correlation reasoning will be expounded in detail.
Here, reasoning refers to the manipulation of the attack facts stored in AKA to generate the
logic conclusion of the attack scenario. Given the PCTCG frames, the semantic operations
and the intrusion database containing the attack knowledge facts, whether or not the goals
of interested correlation can be automatically derived needs to be known.
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The reasoning process has two steps: Conjunctive Aormal Form (CAF) formalization,
and FOAL resolution. In the CAF formalization, PCTCG frames and the attack knowledge
facts are all formatted into CAF clauses. In the reasoning process based on [46], And/or
Resolution Tree is proposed to derive the alert correlations from BAF clauses automatically
using the substitution and the semantic fusion. Substitution is to replace an alert with its
subordinate keyword, whereas the semantic fusion is the process of fusing two clauses into
one.
Definition 3.5.1 GNF is a conjunctive of disjunction of literals.
For example, a CAF has the following form:
where x i , 1 < i < n is a propositional logic clause.
Aecause alerts' PCTCG streams are unit clauses in conjunction format, they are
already in CAF format. For example, CAF of alert 1 FINGER Ο quest and alert 2 FINGER
redirection attempt are:
In FAR-FAR, the intrusion database stores the attack knowledge facts, which are the
unit CAF clause describing a certain semantic role. For example, the facts related with the
alert FINGER bequest are object (finger_requery, finger_daemon) and the met hod (user_account ,
finger_requery). For the reasoning questions, for example, "if both x 1 and x 2 exist, then must
y happen?" can be thought as xi Λ x 2 ,y and expressed as the CAF clause x i Λ x2 Λ iy.
2')
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To decide if the goal G = {object, 9sptial, instrument, 9part-whole, cause} can be derived
from the clauses, FAR-FAR tries to completely resolve the leftmost subsoil with the clause
which has the same predicate name. Chen the resolution is successful, FAR-FAR attempts
another resolution step. Chen the resolution fails, the process backtracks and tries another
inference step. The whole procedure constitutes the depth-first and left-toAright order. The
attack resolution derivation is commonly represented by a binary reasoning tree, drawn with
its root at the bottom. Resolution tree is a data structure used for building binary resolution
proofs in FOAL. The main focus is finding efficient ways to extract the correlation between
alerts. All nodes are labeled by the literals which are still to be resolved (known as the
clause label), while internal nodes are labeled with the letter of the atom being resolved.
Consider an automated reasoning procedure that takes a set of clauses as input, and outputs
the correlations.
Figure 3.6 FirstAorder attack reasoning tree.
Figure 3.6 shows the process of the resolution tree between alertly and alert. Initially,
there are no connections between the case filler variables. Chen performing resolution, the
variables are renamed so that they have no variables in common. Afterwards, the resolution
tree tries to determine if the semantic roles R i and R2 can be fused into R3. Here, * is the
semantic role operator. If there exists a semantic operation R i * R2 - R3 and a semantic role
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where R i * R2 - R3 means that semantic roles R1 and R2 can be fused into R3,
S(Alert2, x 2) means that Alert has subordinate keyword x2 , and the substitution O is
instantiated with ι2 /AlArt2.
3.6 Link Padding
Preventing networks from being attacked has become a critical issue for network administrators
and researchers. As a precursor to a network attack, attackers may perform traffic analysis
whereby the aim is to derive mission critical information based on an analysis of the traffic
over the network. One can defend against traffic analysis attacks with the encryption, such as
node encryption or link encryption. Although with encryption, the attacker will not be able
to decode the context of the packets. However, the network links between the nodes can still
be vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks. For instance, using the "packet counting" attack,
the attacker can count the number of packets entering and leaving one node, and determine
the next node which the packets will be sent. Cith the gained link information, the attacker
can launch DDS on the nodes.
Another countermeasure against traffic analysis is to use link padding where the cover
traffic and the real traffic are mixed so that every link's total traffic looks constant or similar
to the attackers. The clients can then transmit a payload independent stream of data on the
links to the servers. In [48], the variant interval link padding method was compared with
the constant interval link padding method. The results indicated that the constant interval
link padding may fail in preventing traffic analysis from determining the rate of real payload
traffic, while the variant interval link padding based countermeasures seem to be effective.
A method of constant interval link padding was described in [2], which is shown in Figure
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3.7. This method chose a value from a heavy tail distribution as the current traffic rate
and swap with a more suitable value if the current value does not meet the link traffic rate
requirement. However, it has several drawbacks: First, it requires all paths to generate the
cover traffic for every requesting path. Second, since the solution is constant link padding, the
densely incoming packets may subtly delay the timer's interrupt routine which is in charge of
generating the cover traffic and the attacker can analyze the timer's delayed time to obtain
the link information [48] . Furthermore, in the heavy tail distribution, the probabilities of the
larger values are much smaller than the smaller ones. Most traffic rate candidates are very
small that does not meet for the requirement of high speed link transmission.
Van et al. [49] proposed the Variant Packet Sending-interval Link Padding method
(VPSLP) to defend against the traffic analysis attacks on the links between the IDS sensors
and FARAFAR based on the Preto distribution. The Pareto distribution is a simple heavy
tailed distribution with the probability mass function defined as: P[x] = αkαχ-α -1 where
, k > 0, x> k. Figure 3.8 shows a simplified anonymity system including IDS sensors and
agents. Link encryption is not enough to protect the anonymity of the system. For example, if
the attacker needs to know which sensor A is communicating with agent A. The attacker can
eavesdrop the links before and after the ingress anonymizing node, and collects the number of
the packets transmitted or the packet inter-arrival time. After the comparisons, the attacker
can derive the route between sensor A and agent A, and launch attacks on the nodes. The
countermeasure against traffic analysis is to use link padding where the cover traffic and the
real traffic are mixed so that every link's total traffic looks constant or similar to the attackers.
Figure 3.8 Anonymous links in FORFAR.
As shown in Figure 3.9, consider the link between a client and a server. On the client
side, there exist two kinds of buffers: the traffic buffer and the constant length buffer. The
function of the traffic buffer is to store the incoming packets. Suppose the traffic buffer is
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large enough so that it will not overflow (since the link transmission rate in the anonymizing
systems is not very high). The constant length buffer sends the packets exactly according
to the generated heavy tail distribution. Every value from the heavy tail distribution can
be treated as a timer. If the timer does not expire, the constant length buffer will hold the
packet, otherwise, the packet is sent right away. The swapping between the values of the
heavy tail distribution is not allowed. Let the constant length buffer's length be 1. If the
incoming packet's length is bigger than 1, the sending anonymizing node can split the packet
into several segments and the receiving anonymizing node can combine the segments. Aote
that the smallest value in the heavy tail distribution is larger than the time to fill up the
constant length buffer, and the time to pad the whole constant length buffer can be ignored.
When the constant length buffer is filled up, it sends out the packet and fetches the next
value from the heavy tail distribution. The time to fetch the value from the distribution is
also considered negligible. The cover traffic is generated under two conditions. First, the sum
of the incoming packet size and the total size of the packets in the buffer is greater than 1,
then the cover traffic is padded to fill up the constant length buffer. If the timer does not
expire, the buffer will hold until the timer expires. Otherwise, the buffer sends the packet
out immediately. Second, if the constant length buffer is not padded up and the timer has
already expired, the cover traffic is padded to fill up the buffer, and then the packet is sent
out.
VPSLP does not generate the cover traffic all the time, but based on the incoming
traffic and the generated heavy tail distribution. VPSLP is also better than the method which
inserts the cover traffic at random, because the randomness can often be removed by using
the statistical methods. Links with the same starting node are called the node's link group.
Every link group uses the same value of a and k to generate the heavyAtail distribution. If
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the control unit detects the traffic change on any link within the link group, lets l = μ, and
k = μ — γ. Initially, the three Preto distributions ( = 1.3, 1.5, and 2.O) are mixed with
equal probability. They are modified based on the change of the traffic burstiness degree.
Let < Α i , Α2, A3 >_< O.75, O.85,1 > and P H , P2, and P3 be mixed probabilities of the linkO,
linkl, and link, respectively,
The packet sendingAinterval distribution of the whole link group will change simultaneously
to defend against the traffic analysis attack.
In IDS, the anomaly detection is often used to find the attack traffic. Consider the
scenario shown in Figure 3.1O, after compromising the client, the attacker can pour the
abnormal traffic, whose destination is to the server, into the link between client Α and the
ingress anonymizing node of Α. The abnormal data may have specific pattern of the packet
interval time or the packet size. Cithout the link padding, the abnormal pattern will be
present on the link between node Α and node D (since Α — D is part of the route to the
server). In VPSLP, because the control unit adjusts only the sending-interval heavy tail
distribution and 1, based on the traffic changes, the abnormal traffic can only have effect on
the heavy tail distribution and 1, and none of the three links (node Α to node A, node Α to
node C, and node Α to node D) will have the abnormality. However, if we apply the traffic
anomaly detection on the control unit, the abnormal traffic can be detected.
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Ce simulated three links: node A to node A, node A to node C, and node A to node
D, which were labeled as linkO, linki, and link respectively. Traffic datasets from [50] are
used. As seen in Figure 3.11, without link padding, the throughputs of all three links in 200
seconds are very much different due to the different input traffic traces. With link padding,
the traffic throughput patterns of all the links are statistically similar.
bins
Figure 3.12 HFV of traffic after link padding.
As shown in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.12, unlike the original traffic without link padding,
the descriptive statistics of link traffic with link padding and Histogram Feature Vector (HIV)
are statistically similar. Furthermore, the performance of the endAto-end delay of the real
traffic in one second does not degraded significantly as compared with the original traffic.
Aable 3.8 Descriptive Statistics of Link Traffic with Link Padding
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This is because the generated heavy tail distribution fit well with the original traffic's packet
interAarrival time distribution.
To defend against the attacker's abnormal traffic, the work in this dissertation takes
advantage of the histogram skewness distribution and uses the histogram feature vectors as
the input features to the Principle Component Analysis (PICA). On the anonymizing node,
the packet inter-arrival time series is divided into certain segments (for example, 40O values
every segment). Then, every segment is divided into k bins and compute the histogram of
k equivalent time bins for each segment. The scope chosen for the histogram in each data
set is 1.0μ ti 2.0μ from the mean. In the simulation, k = 14 is chosen. The reasons to use
PCA are following: 1) In the network traffic, the bins are a set of correlated variables. PCA
can transform them into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables. 2) High dimension requires
high computation cost, so PICA is used to reduce the high dimension to two dimension. 3)
PCA can minimize the average projection errors [51]. The main use of PCA is to reduce
the dimensionality of a data set while retaining as much information as possible. PCA is a
multivariate procedure, in which a set of correlated variables are transformed into a set of
uncorrelated variables. PCA chooses orthogonal linear combinations of the predictor variables
that maximize the variance. PCA allows us to visualize and analyze the M observations
(initially described by the N variables) on a low dimensional map. PCA provides the optimal
view for a variability criterion, and builds a set of P correlated factors (p < N) that can
be reused as input for other statistical methods [52] .
The total number of anomaly trace segments is 359 traces, while the normal ones are
646 traces. The histogram trace generated is used as a feature vector. Then, PICA is applied
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Figure 3.14 PBA results before and after inserting abnormal traces.
on the vector and projects it into the first two components. The histogram feature vectors
generated above are used as the input to PICA, which projects the results into the first two
components. Figure 3.13 shows the PICA results of the three incoming packet interAarrival
time series of node A, node C, and node D. If the attacker inserts abnormal traffic to a node,
it can be detected by applying PCA and the node's control unit will not adjust the heavy
tail distribution and 1, thus defeating the attack. Figure 3.14 are the PCA results before and
after adding the abnormal traces. The abnormal traffic is mapped to the left corner.
CHAPTER 4
FIRST-ORDER REASONING
In this chapter, FAR-FAR's automatic alert correlation reasoning will be expounded in detail.
Given PCTCG frames, the semantic operations rules, and the intrusion database containing
the attack knowledge facts, the security administrator wants to know whether or not the
goals of interested correlation can be automatically derived.
4.1 And/or Correlation Rule Tree
To extract the alert correlations, an And/or Borrelation Rule Tree (AORTA) is proposed.
AORTA includes the correlation rules, the attack facts (attack knowledge facts), and the
semantic operations. Using the PCTCG streams as inputs, AORTA is traversed to produce
the attack scenarios as the outputs. As shown in Figure 4.1, AORTA is divided in two parts:
the semantic matching and the resolution tree. In semantic matching, 2AAASA is used to
correlate two alerts; that is, the principal —4 subordinate correlation and subordinate —i
principle correlation. Afterwards, the FOAL resolution tree tries to determine if the semantic
hatchings satisfy the following correlation rules: cause, location, instrument, object, part-
whole, and possible cause, by checking the semantic role facts stored in the attack database
and semantic operation facts.
4.1.1 2-Atom Alert Semantic Network
Semantic networks have been used in artificial intelligence for representing knowledge. It is
a directed graph used for representing objects and the relations among them. The objects,
shown as labeled circles, are referred to as nodes. The properties and relations of objects
are expressed as directed arrows connecting the nodes. In this dissertation, 2-AASN is
proposed as the semantic correlation representation between two alerts based on [53] . The
edges of 2AAASN represents PCTCG semantic attributes or the label subordinates, and the
nodes represent two atom alerts or their child nodes: case filler or the subordinate keyword.
The formal description of 2AAASA is based on the 2Atuple slot, < sAmantic attributes, case
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fillAr >, or < subordinatA, subordinate keyword >, which describes the semantic role or
subordinated keyword:
The algorithm Gen2AΑΑSA shown in Figure 4.2 is used to construct 2AΑΑSA from
two atom alerts. It works under the Principal-subordinate relation. Chen one alert is in
the subordinate phase, if its subordinate keywords are in a specific relationship with the
principle alert, these two alerts are correlated. The process that the subordinate alert is
replaced with the subordinate keyword is called substitution. For example, consider Snort
alerts: FINGER O quAry and FINGER rAdirection attAmpt. The PCTCG format stream
of these two alerts are shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 Semantic matching between PCTCG alert formats.
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The edges of 2AΑΑSΝ represents PCTCG semantic attribute or the label subordinate,
and the nodes represent two atom alerts or their child nodes: case filler or the subordinate
keyword. The format of 2AΑΑSΝ is based on the 2-tuple slot: < semantic attributes, case
filler >, or < subordinatA, subordinate keyword >. The algorithm Gen2AΑΑSΝ [4] was
used to construct 2AΑΑSΝ from two alerts. If there exists semantic attribute matching
between the case filler and subordinate keyword, 2-ΑΑSΝ fills the slots: node  :: case filler
< sAmantic attribute, node :: subordinate kAyword > or node :: casA filler < semantic
attribute, model :: subordinatA keyword >, and an arc between the case filler and subordinate
keyword is generated. Using this procedure, the 2AΑΑSΝ format of the Snort alerts is
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4.1.2 Resolution Tree
In order to extract the attack scenario from 2-AASN, the resolution tree in Section 3.5,
which works on CIF, was proposed. Initially, there are no connections between the case
filler variables. Chen performing resolution, the variables are renamed so that they have no
variables in common. Afterwards, the semantic roles R 1 and R2 try to be fused into R3. Here,
* is the semantic role operator. Figure 4.5 illustrates an example of the resolution tree for
alerts FINGER 0 quest and FINGER redirection attempt. From CC(Alert2i Indirect Bonn)
and OB(indirect connection, username), the resolvent CC(Alert2i  username) can be derived.
(Note that the two semantic operations are fused into one.) Moreover, from CC(Alert2i ,
username) and © = username/Alert s , CC(Alert2i  Alert s ) can be obtained, and -CC
(Alert, Alert s ) and CC(Alert2i , Alert s ) can be resolved into the empty clause.
Table 4.1 Semantic Role Fusion Operations
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4.2 Correlation Rules
In the resolution tree, the correlation rules are defined and applied to extract the alerts
correlations from 2-ΑΑSΝ. The semantic operator * is defined: principle alert : < semantic
attribute, principle alert :: case filler > * principle alert :: case filler :< semantic attributA,
subordinate alert :: subordinatA keyword >. Table 4.1 shows the semantic role fusion
operations. Some semantic roles cannot be fused and they are marked by Ο.
Table 4.2 Correlation Rules
Consider the two parent nodes in 2-ΑΑSΝ: node Α and node B. The case filler and
subordinate keyword of node Α and B are denoted as Α :: casA filler, Α :: keyword, B ::
casA filler and B :: keyword, respectively. The (possible) cause, enable, instrument, object,
part-whole, and spatial rules are defined. The enable rule takes place when one entity
facilitates the other's attack process. The spatial rule describes the situation where one entity
is surrounded by another entity but is not part of that entity. The (possible) cause, enable,
instrument, and object rules are concerned with attack action "time" domain whereas the
partAwhole and spatial rules are related to "space" domain. Every correlation rule includes
two matching phrases: the active way (primary = secondary) and the passive way (primary
secondary) . Table 4.2 shows these correlation rules.
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Chen extracting the correlations, if the sum of the weights of the principle alert's
semantic attribute and the filled slot is greater than the semantic weight threshold (set to
be 5), the * operation is performed. For example, the correlation between the two alerts,
FINGER 0 query and FINGER redirection attempt, is shown in Figure 4.6. The attack
scenario classes can be generated from the alert correlations. The attack scenario class is a
directed graph where nodes are alert components, and arcs are semantic correlations. The
similarity degree between attack scenario classes, Si and S2, is defined as:
where w2 is the weight of the common links between S i and S2, w3 is the link weight of S 1 ,
and wk is the link weight of S2. For example, Figure 4.7 shows different Sim values with the
changes of attack semantic dependency networks.
Figure 4.7 Attack scenario class similarity degree.
We also define the scenario stages, which are based on the subAobjective. The sub-
objective is based on the consequence tagging class: gather information (try to gather the
network information and application vulnerabilities), make enable (try to break into target
and get control on the target), and launching attacks.
4.3 Alert Context Window
Since the attack scenario classes include all possible combinations of attack strategies and the
attackers may only adopt a subset of the attack strategies to launch the attacks. To build the
attack scenario, the alert contexts need to be considered. Because of the high volume of the
alerts, it is not possible to consider correlation between the interested focus alert and all other
alerts. Therefore, the alert context window size needs to be determined, and we only consider
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the alerts within the context window and generate the attack scenarios from them. In ALP,
context is used to determine the pronunciation, words collocation and words unambiguity
[54, 55] . Here, the alerts context refers to the source and destination ^P addresses, and
timestamps within a certain context window. The alert context window /ACC) size is an
important parameter of the alert context, which is the number of alerts before and after the
interested focus alert. If the ACW size is too small, the correlated alerts would be absent. On
the other hand, if the ACW size is too large, unnecessary computations and correlation noises
/unrelated alerts) will be added. To extract attack scenarios, ACC should provide enough
semantic information, and also restrains the correlation noises. However, there is no general
method to define the size of the context window in natural language processing. In [56], the
context window f five can provide 95 % context for the linguistic collocations. Reference
[57] also sets the window size to five to show the constraints between verbs and arguments.
However, a small window size can identify the fixed expressions and word collocations that
hold over a short range. Aecause of the interest in the semantic correlation between the alerts,
a larger alert window size which can cover the semantic knowledge is preferable. The mutual
information method [56] is used to determine the ACW size. Mutual information, which is a
measurement of the associative strength between a pair of events, is defined to be:
where a # c and I /a, c, d) is the association ratio of two alerts a and c, and pea) and p/c) are
the probabilities of a and c, and p(a, c, d) is the probability that a occurs before or after c at
the distance d. If there is an association between a and c, I /a, c, d) » 0 .
From Figure 4.8, it is clear that as the alert context window size increases, the degree
of the mutual information decreases. At some distances, the associations are very small and
do not decrease significantly, at which there are almost no associations between them. Cithin
the ACW context range, the alerts and their semantic attributes build up the attack scenarios.
To determine ACC, the alerts' mutual information along with the similarity degrees Sim are
used. r is set as the value of ACC where mutual information approaches O.1. The mutual
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Figure 4.8 Mutual information for
various ACC size.
information MIA, C, d) presents the alert frequency dependency between the alerts, while
the attack scenario similarity degree Sim shows the changes of attack semantic correlations
on the consecutive contexts. Therefore, the value of ACC is defined as follows:
where α and β are adjustable factors. In the simulations, α is set as O.5 and β as 4, and
initial ACC value is set as 35, 45, 6O for the three datasets shown in Figure 4.9, respectively,
according to their diverse alert contexts. In the simulations, IDS sensors Snort [6] and
Realsecure [58] were used, and datasets from [5O] were tested on a PC (Pentium 4 processor
at 2.8 GHz with 256M DDR memory). The gaol is to test:
1. Chether the time for PCTCG to convert the raw alerts into frame streams, and the
FOAL reasoning time can facilitate FARAFAR real-time processing;
2. The performance of the attack scenario extraction.
FORFAR converts the alerts into IDMEF format and then into frame streams based
on the PCTCC rules. The Snort Intrusion Event Database [59] includes 577 events. 55O
snort alerts were selected from different class types to build up 55O PCTCC rules, and 117
Realsecure alerts were chosen from [58]. For Snort, five datasets (DDS 1.O, DDS 2.O,
DARPA 1999 week 2 Monday, Friday, and 1998 week 6 Cednesday) were tested for the
PCTCC converting time according to the alert number and the rule number. Figure 4.1O(a)
shows a plot of the PCTCC converting time versus the alert number for 35 PCTCG rules.
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Figure 4.9 ACC vs. alert context bin.
Datasets DARPA 1999 week 2 Friday, and 1998 week 6 Wednesday spent more time than
DDS 1.O, DDS 2.O because they had relatively longer alert messages. The alerts were
aggregated according to the 'P address and consecutive time slot; these correlated alerts
were all less than 2OOO. Afterwards, the PCTCG rule number was increased up to 55O; the
PCTCC processing time of the datasets with relative fewer alerts does not climb sharply
with the increased PCTCC rule number, as shown in Figure 4.1O(b). After aggregation,
as shown in Figure 4.1O(c), the processing time had sharply decreased to no more than 12
seconds, indicating that PCTCG conversion can be processed in real time. Figure 4.1O(f)
shows the alert reasoning time and the alert inter-arrival time. It is clear that the alert
reasoning time is far less than the inter-arrival time. However, there are a few alerts whose
reasoning time is larger than the inter-arrival time. This can be attributed to: (1) some attack
actions cause more than one alerts ( e.g., alerts FINGER 0 quest and FINGER request are
all caused by FINGER action); (2) port scanning causes a number of alerts, making those
alerts' inter-arrival time extremely small. However, the alerts by port scanning normally
cannot be reasoned because they are usually correlated with each other. Therefore, the
FAR-FAR system can efficiently automatically reason the attack plans.
To test FARAFAR's reasoning performance, DARPA 1999 week 2 Wednesday, Dos
1.O, and DDos 2.O datasets were tested. In Figure 4.1O(d), at some ACC distances, the
normalized mutual information are very small and do not decrease significantly, and the
initial ACW values for those datasets were set as 35, 45, 6O. Figure 4.1O(e) shows the
real-time adjustment according to their diverse alert contexts.
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4.4 Alert Semantic Vector
In ALPO, text categorization means the assignment of free text documents to one or more
predefined categories based on their contents. A number of statistical classification and
machine learning techniques have been applied to text categorization [6O, 61]. In this section,
mutual information is used to determine the alert semantic context range.
Figure 4.11 Abstraction of the "gain information" ontology.
Aased on the attack ontology and alert contexts, alerts are represented as attack
semantic space vectors. A text categorization technique is then applied to categorize the
intrusion stages. Ahe retrieval method is based on measuring the similarity between queries
and documents.
Figure 4.13 Abstraction of the "launching attacks" ontology.
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Figure 4.14 Vector space model.
The vector space model method in [60] is used for the alert categorization. First,
alerts are divided into segments by consecutive timeslots, and each segment is viewed as a
"document". The alerts in each document is represented by the PCTCG frame subordinate
keywords, a features defined by the attack ontology. Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 show the
fragments of the FAR-FAR attack ontology, which is the extension from the previous research
works in [35, 36, 37] . Afterwards, the feature term frequency (tf) in each document is counted,
and a feature weight is calculated using the tf and the inverse document frequency (id)
method (TFAIDF) [62]. The raw tf of a feature term in a alert segment is multiplied by the
term's idf weight:
where tfBd is the frequency with which feature k, 1 < k < n, occurs in the alert segment d,
N is the total number of alert segments in the log corpus, and DB is the number of segments
containing feature k. Afterwards, the vector is normalized:
Finally, the similarity between an alert's vector and an intrusion category's centroid is
measured, as shown in Figure 4.14. The intrusion category's centroid is calculated from the
training data. Three intrusion categories are defined: gain information (g), making enable
(.M), and launching attacks (L).
In Figure 4.15, the feature's tf values are stored in the tf hash table. Suppose there
exist three intrusion stages, each of which includes several substages. Every substage has a
Figure 4.15 Feature t f hash table of intrusion stages.
feature link, connected by a set of t f links for every feature. From the t f hash table, t f and
idf values can be calculated (Dk  is the total number of link nodes for feature k). Cosine-based
similarity between two n dimensional semantic space vectors, an alert ads semantic vector
and a category vector j , is measured by:
where a belongs to the category with the highest value.
To evaluate the intrusion categorization performance, three classification methods
(TF-IDF, Aaive Bayes, and KNN) [63] were compared using the classification tool. The
DARPA datasets were mixed. 6O% of the DARPA datasets were used as training data, and
the remaining 4O% of the data were tested. The categorization results showed that TF-IDF
had 67.6% for intrusion stage , 9O.1% for .M , and 94.5% for L. That is, TF-IDF has better
performance than Naive Bayes and ANN methods. The reason that TF-IDF has higher
classification ratio in .M and L stages is that the features describing Μ and L activities are
more specific than . Figure 4.16 shows the weight ranking of those features.
Figure 4.16 FAR-FAR simulation results.
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CHAPAER 5
SPREADING ACTIVATION AND SEMANTIC QUERY
The current IDS monitoring system can hardly provides precise answers for the attack scenario
related queries. In [64, 65], the conjunctive query approach for Semantic Ceb was presented
and will be the basis in defining the semantic attack knowledge query language. The following
are the definitions of the semantic queries.
5.1 Spreading Activation
In the query model, the attack semantic query is used to enable the administrator to query
the intrusion states of the network. The semantic relationships can be queried and discovered
through traversing sequence of links among the entities of interests. Since the attack scenario
classes include all possible combinations of the attack actions, the attack scenario instances
are generated based on the alert context which describes the specific attack scenario. Using
the weight mapping technique, a weight is assigned to each relation instance to express the
associated strength between two nodes. In [65], the cluster weight mapping was introduced
and the formula used to calculate the weight is:
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The value τι denotes the concept C; is related to C. The value nijk denotes that both
concepts C; and Ck are related to C.
The Spread Activation (SA) technique [65] is used in the semantic query model for
attack scenario knowledge retrieval. SA searches for the paths connecting the start nodes
and the destination nodes based on an evaluation criterion. For example, given the initial set
of nodes and their activation values, the activation flows through the network reaching other
concepts which are closely related to the initial concepts. If the current node passes certain
constraints and not all its neighbors are activated, it propagates its activation value to its
neighbors. The activation strength decreases in proportional to the distance in between. The
decay factor is defined to reduce the activation strength within the propagation process. The
activation input into a node can be represented by the following formula:
where ΙΙ is the total input of node j, Oil is the output of node i connecting to node j, a is
the decay factor, and Wig  is the weight associated to the link connecting node i to node j by
the weight mapping. The output activation of node 0, is determined by:
(5.3)
where T is the threshold. The output value is fired to all nodes connected to the active
node. The spreading phase of the pulse consists of the flow of activation waves from one node
to all other nodes connected to it. This cycle goes on until the termination condition is met.
The end result of the SA process is the activation level of each node in the network at the
termination time.
For IDS, at the semantic query interface, the user can express the attack scenario
knowledge query in terms of the attack phrases. Cith the help of attack phrase synonym
knowledge base, the query model searches for all the nodes in the attack instance network
whose subordinate keywords match the attack phrases or the phrases' synonyms. Those
matched nodes are supplied to SA as the initial nodes and their initial activation values
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are set to 1. The user can also define the terminal states (the default terminal states are the
attack launching nodes in the scenarios) to stop the SA process. The set of nodes obtained
at the end of the propagation are presented to the user as the result of the semantic search.
Figure 5.1 Simulations of DARPA LIDOS 1.0 and 99 week 2 Wednesday datasets.
The datasets in the simulations are LIDOS 1.O and 1999 week 2 Cednesday. For
LIDOS 1.0 dataset, two IDS sensors: Snort and RealSecure are used and the generated
alerts are fused. First, the tcpdump datasets is replayed and aggregated according to the
source 'P address, target IPA address, and the consecutive time slot. Afterwards, 2-AASN of
the alerts is built up, and the correlation between them is extracted by the semantic attribute
operation to form the attack scenario class (the semantic match weight threshold is set to
5). The simulation results showed that there were three attack scenario instances in LIDOS
(attacker 2O2.77.162.213 —+ victim 172.16.115.2O, 202.77.162.213 --i victim 172.16.112.10, and
202.77.162.213 —i victim 172.16.112.50). As shown in Table 5.1, FORFAR can decrease the
false alarm sharply. For example, after aggregation, the alert number decreased to O.32%, and
there are O.13% alerts in the attack scenario instance. Furthermore, O.O42% aggregated alerts
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were in the gather information attack stage, O.087% aggregated alerts in the making enable
stage, and O.O074% aggregated alerts in the launching attack stage. The attack scenarios of
two datasets are shown in Figure 5.1. The scenario class of LIDOS 1.O includes six focus alerts
(node 1, node 2, node 3, node 4, node 6 and node 9), and attack instance weight matrices are
also presented in Figure 5.1(a). The attack scenario class of 1999 week 2 Cednesday datasets
is shown in Figure 5.1(b).
Table 5.1 Simulation Results of Alerts Number in Two Alert Datasets (w=5)
Second, the datasets were simulated under different w values to evaluate the performance
of SHIM. w is set as four, five and six, respectively. The simulation results are shown in Table
5.2. For example, when w = 5, the node instance ratio is 0.86, and the link instance ratio is
0.50, implying that the generated attack scenario class can describe the actual attack plan in
the LIDOS 1.O datasets well without causing high false actions and false semantic relations.
Moreover, there is no attack class which misses the focus alert, no attack class which produces
false focus alerts, and no attack class which misses the attack step, implying that FORFAR
can "despise" the unrelated alerts without missing attack steps.
Third, for the attack semantic query, two queries were simulated on the LIDOS 1.O
datasets. Suppose the network administrator knows certain hosts have the vulnerability of
admin service, and wants to know whether this vulnerability can be used to cause the
DDS attacks. Thus, in query 1, he/she inputs the attack state "adman", sets the DDS
as the terminate state, and submits this query to the semantic search model. In query 2,
he/she wants to know what consequence the PC admin overflow event can produce.
Table 5.3 Semantic Search Results of Query 1 and Query 2 (w=5)
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Table 6 shows the query results and its semantic search weights. For query 1, three attack
scenario instances have identical terminal set, and the attack steps from, discovering sadmirid
vulnerability to launching attack (described in [50]) are as follows: Hosts running sadmind
service are probed, by using the "ping" option of the sadmirid exploit program (®); the
attacker tries to break into these hosts by remote buffer-overflow attack (®); to test whether
or not a breakAin was successful, the attacker attempts several login commands via telnet (®);
then, the attacker installs the ".ghosts" file(®), and finally launches the Dos attacks(®).
The semantic search path in Table 5.3, and their activations can clearly inform the network
administrator about the above attack plan. For query 2, the consequence of the RPC Sadmind
overflow event is enabling the attack to install the ".ghosts" file by tenet(®—+®, and ®—*®).
5.3 Comparison with Related Works
In this section, related correlation works are compared with FAR-FAR. First, the performance
of extracting attack scenario is evaluated. Two parameters are defined: the correct correlation
ratio and the number of alerts in the attack scenario. Then the parameter of the false alarm
rate is evaluated. The correct correlation ratio is defined as
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c% if c% of transactions in D containing X also contain Y. The association rule X —> Y
has the support degree s% if s% of the transactions in D contain X U Y [66]. Given a set of
transactions D, the problem of mining association rules is to generate all the association rules
that have s and c greater than the user-specified minimum support and minimum confidence
degrees, respectively.
Table 5.4 Correct Correlation Ratio Between TIARA and FARAFAR.
However, in this dissertation, the Apriori method is spt used for two reasons. First,
for those duplicated alerts indicating the DDS attacks, the aggregation process usually
eliminates them causing very low support degree, which in terms causes those alerts missing
in the attack scenario. Second, for the very common alert, such as "telnet" or "scan" alerts,
since they can be associated with a number of alerts, the association rules containing them will
have very low "confidence" degree, which leads to high "missing focus alerts" and "missing
attack links". In Figure 5.2, we compared the performance of extracting the attack scenario
between FARAFAR and the Priori method. It is clear that the Prior method had much
higher "missing focus alerts" and "missing attack links" value. For the false attack links,
since Apriori extracted much less attack correlations than FARAFAR, it produced a lower
value.
As shown in Table 5.4, for the three datasets, FORFAR has a stable correct correlation
ratio around O.80, whereas the correlation toolkit ΤΕΑΑ in [2O] has 0.93 and 0.67, respectively.
One of the reasons that ΤΕΑΑ has higher correct correlation ratio than FARAFAR is that ΤΕΑΑ
has 44 correlated alerts whereas FARAFAR has only 14 alerts. Figure 5.3 shows that these
14 alerts belong to three intrusion stages. In Table 5.5, the false alarm rate of FARAFAR is
much less than that of ΤΕΑΑ, implying that based on the semantic processing, FARAFAR can
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efficiently "despise" unimportant alerts. In [67], AIDS was used to test the same datasets
from [50], and its false alarm rate was around 5%. Therefore, FAR-FAR reasoning capacity
for the attack scenario can compete well with current correlation tools. Furthermore, based on
the semantic attack ontology, FAR-FAR can also provide the functions of semantic reasoning
and alert categorization.
CHAPAER 6
ANOMALY DETECTION BY HISTOGRAM FEATURE VECTOR
A number of recent studies of real traffic from modern networks demonstrated that real traffic
exhibits statistical selfAsimilarity and heavy-tail, and the traditional models such as Poisson
or Markovian, are basically not applicable to model selfAsimilar traffic. In the heavy tail
distribution, most of the observations are small, but most of the contribution to the sample
mean or the variance comes from the few large observations [68]. On the other hand, the
dramatic expansion of networking applications makes network security a pressing issue. As
increasingly more network facilities are connected to the internet, their vulnerabilities make it
easy for an attacker to initiate attacks. For example, DDS has caused a huge ecospmic loss to
the victims. Therefore, the detection of traffic anomaly is important to the security of modern
networks. Since traffic aspmalies do spt have rigid rules, capturing them is fundamentally
essential to enhance the robustness and survivability of communication networks.
In this chapter, the work statistically analyzes the histograms of ordinaryAbehaving
bursty traffic traces, and apply the Multi-Time scaling Detection (LTD) to detect the bursty
traffic anomalies. Given a traffic trace including some bins, HFV is a vector composed
of the histogram frequency of every bin. Since the self-similar traffic traces follow the
heavy tail distribution, their HFV contain left skewness, resulting from the bulk of the
values being small but with a few samples having large values. Research work in [69]
showed the simply aggregating self-similar traffic traces will spt decrease the heavy tail
characteristic significantly. Therefore, the aggregated traffics on the edge network devices
of high speed network will present selfAsimilarity if the incoming traffics are bursty, and
the high speed network traffic anomalies can be detected by large HIV aspmaly deviation
of self-similar reference traffic trace. Furthermore, since every traffic bin contains different
burstiness characteristics, the burstiness compensation parameter γ is introduced to smooth
the deviation error caused by those burstiness differences.
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6.1 self-similar Traffic Model
Ever since Internet has been developed, both the transmission speed and the service on the
wide-area internet remain a crucial problem. Recent works in traffic analysis have shown
that traffic streams traversing modern networks are Self-similarity over several time scales from
microseconds to minutes [68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. self-similar describes the phespmenon where
a certain property of an object is preserved with respect to scaling in space or in time.
Scaling behaviors of the Internet traffic have a significant impact on network performance.
For example, selfAsimilar traffic causes worse network performance than the Short Range
Dependence traffic does.
Figure 6.1 self-similar in traffic measurement.
In Figure 6.1, the selfAsimilar traffic shows the similar statistical patterns at different
time scales, and the ranges is from 100ms to the minutes, which means that the extended
bursts of activity and inactivity still exist regardless of whether we look at millisecond, second,
minute, or hour averages. This is in dramatic contrast to Poisson process which has the
exponential distribution such that over long time scales, Poisson process has a characteristic
burst length which tends to be smoothed by averaging over a long enough time scale.
For a stationary time series A (t), t Ε R , where X (t) is interpreted as the traffic
volume at time instance t. The aggregated Am of A (t) at aggregation level m is defined as
Amok) , k = O,1, 2, ..., where
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That is, A (t) is partitioned into spnAoverlapping blocks of size an, their values are averaged,
and k indexes these blocks. Despte Rχm(k) and RX (k) as the auto-correlation functions of
where 0 < α < 2. In the heavy tail distribution, most of the observations are small, but most
of the contribution to the sample mean or the variance comes from the few large observations
[68]. The Preto distribution is a simple heavy tailed distribution with probability mass
function defined as
where α is the tail index, and k is the minimum value of F. Multi-time scaling nature
means that A (t) and its time scaled version X(at) , after sprmalization, must follow the
same distribution. That is, if X (t) is selfAsimilar with Hurst parameter H, then for any
a >0, t> 0,
where =d stands for equality of first and second order statistical distributions and a is called
the scale factor.
The variance-time plot and R/S plot are two of the commonly used methods to
calculate the Hurst parameter H. For a given set of observations A (t) = Ft , where t =
0, 1, 2, • • • , the sample mean is:
6.2 Self-similar ':&amc Aggregation
The overall traffic on Internet can be regarded as the aggregation of the traffic from individual
traffic sources. The research work in [73] showed that as the number of traffic sources
increases, the resulting traffic remain bursty. In [69], the simulation results also showed
that the aggregation or superimposition of internet traffics on optical switch does spt result
in a smoother traffic pattern. Actual network traffic may be the aggregation of different traffic
streams having different characteristics. It was shown in [69] H of the aggregated traffic is
roughly equal to the maximum of the Hurst parameters of the individual self-similar sources.
Here the interest focuses on the aggregated bursty traffic on the edge devices of high speed
networks, such as edge routers and edge switches, for two reasons. First, as compared to the
traffic nearby the source spde, the high-speed aggregated traffic at the edge network devices is
relatively more stable. Secondly, the aggregated traffic is easy to be extracted from the whole
network at those edge devices, without much influence on the whole network's performance.
Figure 6.2 Self-similar traffic aggregation.
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Figure 6.2 shows the functional architecture of an edge switch of an high speed network.
It includes a switch module, queue buffer pools, monitor module, and the inlet and outlet links.
The input traffic is aggregated at inlet links whereas the output aggregated traffic appears
at the output side of the switch module. Each outlet link has a queue buffer pool, which is
composed of several FIFO buffers. A buffer is assigned for each QoS class. Several incoming
packets with the identical source address, destination address and QoS class are buffered into
one burst. The monitoring module extracts the input aggregated traffic and split it into some
data sets. Meanwhile, the traffic anomaly detection model detects the traffic aspmaly. The
monitoring module forwards the detection results to the alarm processor.
A burst assembly mechanism is reported in {69j. However, this method only assumes
a constant timeout value. The scheme adopts the dynamic timeout value. Suppose the
j th(j = 1, • • • m) buffer pool is assigned for the th  outlet link of the switch module. Each
buffer pool is composed of n QoS buffers. The switch fabric in the device transfers every
incoming packet to the Ai buffer of a certain outlet. If the buffer of the buffer pool is spt
overflowed or timeout Ti ,j has spt expired, the incoming packet is buffered. Otherwise, the
buffered packet is sent out and Τ Α  is reset. Two triggers for sending out the packet in the Ai
buffer of every buffer pool are the buffer overflow and the timeout expiration. Timeout  Ti,
is started whenever a packet arrives in the empty qi buffer of the nth buffer pool. Since the
network traffic is spt stable, the number of timeout triggers and the number of the buffer
overflow triggers for the itchbuffer in thejtpool are recorded asN(i,Α)timer mta d
Ν(i,Α)^jf fear overfΙοω. Let P(i,Α)timeout be the percentage of the number of timeout triggers with
respect to the total triggers in every itchbuffer in thentpool.P(i,Α) imeouts defined as:
The value of timeout Τi ,Α can be determined based on P(i,Α)timeout• For example, if
P(i,Α)timemιt = 0.6 > 0.5, which means that the traffic load is spt high, the timeout value
should increase, and vice versa. Thus, let timeout
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For example, in the algorithm the buffer size b is 2560 bits, the packet data length is constant,
the initial timeout Τρ is 0.001s, and the simulation time is four seconds. The destination
outlets are randomly chosen. In [72], six incoming traffic traces were generated, and these
traces were aggregated at the edge switch, as shown in Figure 6.3. After going through the
queuing FIFO buffers, shaped aggregated traffic was forwarded to the high speed network.
Table 6.1 shows the assumed Hurst parameters, and the measured Hurst parameters of these
traces and aggregated trace. Input aggregated traffic H is 0.8543, which approaches to the
maximum H value of the six input traces. The output aggregated traffic H is 0.8335, which
means that simply aggregating selfAsimilar traffic traces at the edge devices will spt decrease
burstiness. However, after going through the traffic shaping, H decreases to 0.771348.
6.3 Histogram Feature Vector
In this section, HIV of self-similar traffic is introduced based on two important features of
selfAsimilarity: the multi-time scaling nature and heavy-tailed distribution. A heavy-tailed
distribution gives rise to large values with non-negligible probability so that sampling from
such a distribution results in the bulk of small values but with a few large values. As a result,
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HIV of burst traffic presents the left skewness characteristic. Multi-time scaling nature
means that self-similar trace A (t) and its aggregated traffic at time scale "at", X (at), follow
the same first order and second order statistical distribution. Based on A (at), the reference
trace Χ(t) can be generated:
Afterwards, A (t) is divided into k bins, and HIV of these bins and Br  (t) are calculated.
The optimum bin number k has an important effect on HIV. If k is too small, it will make
the histogram overAsmoothed, while an excessively large k will not correctly reflect the traffic
changes. Sturges [10] used a binomial distribution to approximate the normal distribution.
When the bin number k is large, the normal density can be approximated by a binomial
distribution B(K — 1, 0.5), and the histogram frequency is {ίίk]  . Then, the total number of
data is
However, because of the sprmal distribution assumption, Sturges' rule and Doane still do
spt always provide espugh bins to reveal the shape of severely skewed distribution (i,e.,
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In the simulations, the traffic traces come from various sources: traffic trace 4 mentioned
in Section 2, the aug89 trace from [8], and DARPA 1999 week 2 Iriday data set from [50].
Iigure 6.4 shows HIV of these data sets with the left skewness distributions. Due to the
heavy-tail distribution, a large number of small values locate in the first three bins, whereas
few large values locate in the remaining bins (the relative high histogram frequency in the
last bin is caused by the large bin size) .
6.4 Traffic Anomaly Detection
In this section, Multi-Time scaling Detection (LTD) is proposed to detect the self-similar
traffic aspmalies by comparing the distribution deviation between traffic sets with reference
trace. In particular, the interest focuses on the self-similar aggregated traffic on the edge
network devices. As a large volume of traffic flows through these network access points at very
high speed, these access points are most suitable for placing the anomaly detection systems. A
segment packet inter-arrival time trace A (t) of the input aggregated traffic at an edge switch
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(b) Deviations from reference model.
Figure 6.5 Detect aspmaly traffic with MTD.
includes the absprmal traffic. Irom (6.17), total bin number is set to 30, and the aggregate
traffic in time scale 30t, X (30t), is built up. The reference trace is Xr(t) = 30—ΗΧ(30t),
and the whole time series is divided into 30 data segments. Ior each segment, the histogram
frequency is calculated, and HIVE includes 30 histogram frequencies. MTD compares the
HIV of X (t) with Χ(t) by deviation. Iigure 6.5(b) presents the HIVE of the last 10 bins
(21st to 30 th ). The traffic aspmaly exists in the 30 th bin, with sharp distinction. Iigure 6.5(a)
shows that the traffic aspmaly exists in the 30th data set, which is distinctly different from
the reference model.
In the simulation, it is observed that each data set appears to have different burstiness
characteristics, which should be considered when detecting traffic aspmalies. Smoothed
burstiness parameter β and the burstiness compensation parameter y are used to smooth
the deviations error, which results from the burstiness of data set. The smoothed burstiness
parameter of the i th data set is defined as
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Based on , the bursts compensation parameter ri of the it h data set is defined as
where k is the total number of bins of the histogram, and Z, is the number of packets in the
jthbin of the histogram. Table 6.2 shows the HFV deviations error with compensation.w
smoothes the deviation error caused by the burstiness of the traffic within the well-behaved
data sets; it has little effect on that in the abnormal traffic.
Table 6.2 Smooth Deviations Error with Compensation
In this chapter, LTD analyzed the aggregated traffic to identify traffic anomalies. The
monitoring module generates the reference traffic model, and can detect traffic anomalies by
large aspmaly deviation from ordinaryAbehaving traffic with the compensation weight.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary
This dissertation presents an IDS framework for extracting the attack scenarios from log
data for attack reasoning and query. In addition, the current research goals for IDS have
been addressed. This dissertation expounds on the research efforts in applying NLP and
FOAL based methods in implementing the FAR-FAR semantic scheme. The following aspects
have been addressed in this dissertation:
• In Section 2, inspired by the semantics of attack behaviors, the work in this dissertation
combined the NLP and FOAL ideas in IDS. The layered attack kspwledge representation
formalism and the functional architecture of the semantic scheme were also reported.
• The basic concepts of DL was introduced in Section 3. The modified case grammar,
PCTCG was used to transfer the heterogeneous alerts into machineAunderstandable
uniform streams. Iurthermore, a robust Variant Packet Sending-interval Link Padding
algorithm (VPSLP) was proposed to prevent the links between the IDS sensors and the
IARAFAR agents from traffic analysis attacks.
• In Section 4, the alert semantic network, 2-AASN, was used to generate the attack
scenarios to alert the security administrator. Then, the correlation operations and
rules were defined to extract the alerts correlations from 2-AASN. ACW was also
considered when extracting attack strategies to decrease the false alarm rate and realA
time processing.
• In Section 5, a conjunctive semantic query approach was presented to query the attack
status. This semantic attack knowledge query language was based on the technique of
Spreading Activation.
• In Section 6, the burst traffic aspmaly detection method, Multi-Aime scaling Detection
(MTD), was proposed to statistically analyze the network traffic's Histogram Ieature
Vector to detect the traffic aspmalies.
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7.2 Future Research
The work addressed in this dissertation is spt near to be conclusive. This dissertation focuses
on the requirements for IDS from the viewpoint of alert fusion and highAlevel reasoning. In
order for the framework to be as comprehensive as possible, more work need to be done. The
future research directions include:
• The actionAcentric ontology have developed. However, the design and enrichment of the
attack ontology or taxonomy requires further development.
• The attack prediction model should be implemented to detect early stages of an attack,
based on the categorization results of the alerts.
• Currently, the weights of the ontology relations are set manually according to the
security level of the attack actions. In order to meet the requirements of different
security administrators, a new algorithm is needed to calculate those weights dynamically.
• The techniques for enabling communication among IDS sensors and FORFAR needs
further study.
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